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I dare speak confidently and positively of very few things, except of matters 
of fact.  
— Boyle (“A Pröemial Essay”, I, 307).
We have at hand examples of reason judging morally. We can analyze them 
into their elementary concepts and, in default of mathematics, adopt a proce-
dure similar to that of chemistry — the separation, by repeated experiments 
on common human understanding, of the empirical from the rational that 
may be found in them. 




moral	premise	 that	would	ground	our	 status	 as	 free	 agents,	 and	he	




authority	may	be	called	a	“Fact	of	Reason”	(Faktum der Vernunft)	(KpV, 
AA	5:47,	5:31).	Incredibly,	Kant	then	appealed	to	this	alleged	“fact”	to	
justify	our	status	as	 free	agents,	effectively	arguing	 from	morality	 to	
freedom,	rather	than	from	freedom	to	morality.	Unfortunately	for	Kant,	







to	 a	 kind	 of	 dogmatic	metaphysics”	 (Kant’s Theory of Mind,	 218–219).	 Scho-



















1. A History of “Fact”
In	the	Romano-canon	tradition,	matters	of	fact	pertained	to	a	sphere	
distinct	from	matters	of	law,	as	expressed	by	the	maxim:	“Da mihi facto 
dabo tibi ius”	(“You	give	me	the	facts,	I	give	you	the	law”),	from	Quintil-




















5.	 Cited	in	Shapiro,	Culture of Fact,	9.
In	this	paper,	my	aim	is	to	offer	a	more	charitable	reading	of	Kant’s	
strategy	of	justification	in	the	second	Critique.2	I	will	do	so,	however,	
by	 taking	what	may	 seem	 to	 be	 an	 unlikely	 detour:	working	 from	
the	 traditions	 of	 Romano-canon	 and	 English	 common	 law;	 to	 the	
works	 of	 the	 British	 experimentalists	 in	 the	 seventeenth	 century;	
and	finally,	 to	 the	German	translation	of	Bishop	Butler’s	Analogy of 
Religion	in	1756.	While	my	ultimate	concern	here	is	to	defend	a	new	
systematic	reading	of	Kant’s	Faktum	(sections	3–4),	I	believe	that	trac-
ing	 the	history	of	 “fact”	 through	 these	phases	 is	 necessary	 for	 put-
ting	his	 argument	 in	 its	proper	 context	 (sections	 1–2).	As	we	 shall	
see,	Kant’s	Faktum	shares	the	meaning	of	a	“matter	of	fact”	(Tatsache),3 







offs.	One	 is	 that	 it	 shows	why	Kant’s	mysterious	 allusions	 to	 chem-
istry	 in	 the	 second	Critique	 are	of	 central	 importance	 (KpV	AA	5:92;	






























century,	 this	 new	way	 of	 thinking	was	 common	 currency.	 Yet	 there	
is	no	question	that	Locke	contributed	to	this	shift	by	raising	the	con-
cept	of	“fact”	to	a	philosophical	category.	In	the	chapter	of	the	Essay 
devoted	 to	degrees	of	 assent,	 Locke	 identified	a	matter	of	 fact	with	
“some	particular	Existence”	capable	of	observation	and	testimony,	al-










common	 law,	 the	 strategy	 of	 multiplying	 witness	 testimony.	 See	 Shapin,	
“Boyle’s	 Literary	 Technology”;	 Shapin	 and	 Schaffer,	 Leviathan and the Air-
Pump: Hobbes, Boyle, and Experimental Life;	 Serjeantson,	 “Testimony	 and	
Proof	in	Early-Modern	England”;	and	Shapiro,	“The	Concept	‘Fact’”,	Culture 
of Fact,	and	“Testimony”.	Very	often	 the	 technology	of	 the	experiment	was	
so	rare	—	as	with	Boyle’s	air-pump	—	that	only	a	few	individuals	could	ever	
experience	 the	 effects	 first-hand.	 As	 Shapin	 has	 argued,	 Boyle	 attempted	
to	 supplement	 the	 absence	 of	 first-hand	witnesses	with	 literary	 technolo-
gies	—	his	own	written	reports	and	illustrations	of	the	case	—	that	would	re-


































6.	 Cited	in	Shapiro,	Culture of Fact,	40.
7.	 Bacon,	The Advancement of Learning,	288.
8.	 See	Shapiro,	“Testimony”,	esp.	250–251.















beyond	our	control,	 the	 “objection	 from	Necessity”.	Yet	 in	his	view	
the	objection	has	no	significance;	it	only	arises	from	the	standpoint	
of	 abstract	 speculation.	 From	 the	 standpoint	 of	 real	 deliberation,	
Butler	argued,	we	are	already	conscious	of	a	“rule	of	action”	within	
























canon	 tradition,	matters	 of	 fact	 were	 distinguished	 from	matters	 of	





man	deeds	 to	natural	phenomena.	 In	 their	hands,	 facts	were	effects	
(often	reproduced	through	experiment)	that	warranted	the	scientist’s	
full	 conviction.	Over	a	period	of	 two-hundred	years,	 then,	 the	 legal	
sense	of	fact	gave	way	to	what	may	be	called	a	“scientific”	sense,	com-




2. “Facts”: From England to Germany









	 oȸen	ȸȢre Rethinking Kant’s Fact of Reason
philosophers’	imprint	 –		5		–	 vol.	14,	no.	32	(november	2014)
perhaps	play	a	role	in	responding	to	scepticism”.15	In	this	respect,	too,	












2.2. “Facts” in Kant’s Theoretical Philosophy














facti,	and	 is	 thus	not	at	 issue	here,	 since	 the	 fact	 [Tatsache]	 is	unre-
servedly	granted”	(Progress,	AA	20:276).






tion	 of	 humankind’s	 “vocation”	 (Bestimmung),	 and	 both	 sides	 of	 the	
controversy	appealed	to	Tatsachen	for	support.14	On	Spalding’s	side,	for	
example,	Moses	Mendelssohn	argued	that	 if	we	want	to	know	what	
designs	Providence	has	 in	 store	 for	us,	we	 should	not	 “work	up	hy-
potheses”	but	only	look	to	what	“actually	happens”,	that	is,	to	“matters	
of	fact”	(Tatsachen)	(J,	II,	6).
By	 the	 1790s,	 the	 concept	 developed	 further	 to	 include	 what	
philosophers	working	 in	wake	of	Kant’s	philosophy	called	“facts	of	
consciousness”	(Tatsachen des Bewusstseins).	Karl	Reinhold	used	this	
phrase,	 for	 instance,	 to	designate	 “a	 kind	of	 evidence	 that	was	nei-
ther	deductive	nor	inductive	but	nevertheless	valid,	and	that	could	
13.	 Spalding,	Bestimmung,	192.	For	helpful	discussions	of	Spalding’s	influence	on	
German	 theology	 and	philosophy	 in	 the	 late	 eighteenth	 century,	 see	Zam-
mito,	Kant, Herder, and the Birth of Anthropology;	di	Giovanni,	Freedom and Re-
ligion;	Brandt,	Die Bestimmung des Menschen bei Kant;	Munzel,	Kant’s Concep-














almost	before	our	eyes”	(Es ist Tatsache, da Christus auserstanden, denn wir haben 
Evangelium, ein so sicherer Erfolg dieses groen Vorfalls, da er ihn uns beinahe vor die 
Augen bringt)	 (Geschichte Jesu Christi,	 172;	my	 translation).	Ress	was	not	 the	
only	author	of	 the	 time	 to	 characterize	 the	Resurrection	as	a	Tatsache.	 See	
also	Lavater,	Geheimes Tagebuch von einem Beobachter seiner selbst,	esp.	151;	and	
Starck,	Geschichte der Christlichen Kirche des Ersten Jahrhunderts,	esp.	864.













Gradually	 remove	 from	 your	 experiential	 concept	 of	 a	
body	 everything	 that	 is	 empirical	 in	 it	—	the	 color,	 the	
hardness	or	softness,	the	weight,	even	the	impenetrabil-




incorporeal,	 all	 those	 properties	 of	 which	 experience	
teaches	you,	you	could	still	not	take	from	it	that	by	means	








borrowing	 this	 terminology	 from	Henry	Allison	 (Kant’s Transcendental Ideal-
ism,	esp.	104–105).	In	the	first	Critique	Kant	further	says	that	the	necessity	of	


















use	of	our	cognitive	faculty	as	a	fact	[den reinen Gebrauch 




The	empirical derivation,	 however,	 [to	which	Hume	 re-
sorted	as	well],	cannot	be	reconciled	with	the	reality	of	the	











all	persons	to	witness	(“ein Faktum, über dessen Wirklichkeit man alle Menschen 
zu Zeugen rufen kann”)	(Refl	8077).


















In	 Kant’s	 view,	 the	 examples	 of	 mathematics	 and	 natural	 science	 “were	
remarkable	enough	 that	we	might	 reflect	on	 the	essential	element	 in	 the	
change	in	the	ways	of	thinking	that	has	been	so	advantageous	to	them,	and,	
at	least	as	an	experiment,	imitate	it	insofar	as	their	analogy	with	metaphys-




should	 emulate	 the	 revolution	of	 the	 sciences	 in	metaphysics,	Kant	 says:	
“This	method,	 imitated	 from	 the	method	of	 those	who	 study	nature,	 thus	
consists	in	this:	to	seek	the	elements	of	pure	reason	in	that	which admits 





sache	of	moral	consciousness”	(ursprüngliche Tatsache des moralischen Bewuss-
teins).	Schopenhauer	believed	this	contradicted	Kant’s	explicit	warning	from	
the	Groundwork	 that	we	cannot	derive	 the	moral	 law	“from	some	particular 






By	 having	 us	 employ	 a	 procedure	 of	 abstraction,	 Kant	 wants	 us	 to	





faculty.	 In	this	way,	 the	aim	of	Kant’s	 thought	experiment	 is	 to	elicit	
our	actual	consciousness	of	epistemic	necessity,	so	that	when	we	ask,	
“How	is	this	consciousness	possible?”	we	are	led	directly	to	its	source,	





















nations)	determines	the	will,	is	reason	a	true	higher faculty	of	desire”	(KpV, AA 
5:24–25).
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In	 the	 example	 discussed	 earlier	 (from	B6),	Kant	 argued	 that	 space	
is	not	 something	we	can	abstract	 from	a	body,	making	 space	neces-
sary	for	our	representation	of	a	body.	Moreover,	because	this	kind	of	
epistemic	necessity	 is	 not	 something	we	 can	 learn	 from	experience	






















tical	 reason.	This	 is	an	 important	point	of	clarification,	 for	 it	 shows	(contra 
Schopenhauer)	that	Kant	is	abiding	by	the	requirement	he	lays	down	in	the	

























eines reinen Willens entspringt aus den ersteren, wie das Be-
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law	may	be	called	a	Faktum	of	reason”	(KpV,	AA	5:31).	So	within	the	










sphere.	We	need	only	 illustrate	 the	 reality	 of	moral	 consciousness,	
and	we	can	do	 this,	he	 thinks,	by	 turning	 to	examples	of	 common	
moral	 judgment.	Thus,	after	 introducing	the	Fact	of	Reason	at	KpV, 
AA	5:30,	Kant	writes:	“The	Faktum	mentioned	above	is	undeniable”,	
adding:	 “One	 need	 only	 analyze	 the	 judgments	 that	 people	 [Men-




a	 kind	 of	 ‘Tatsache’	—	although	 there	 are	 differences	 worth	mentioning.	 In	
Kleingeld’s	view,	“the	entire	argument	[of	the	Fact	of	Reason]	can	be	cast	in	
(presumably	‘non-moral’)	terms	of	a	theory	of	action	and	be	regarded	as	the	





whether	Kant	meant	 “lawfulness”	here	 in	non-moral	 terms.	Kleingeld	 then	




the	moral law […]	that	first offers	itself	to	us	and	[…]	leads	directly	to	the	con-
cept	of	freedom”	(KpV,	AA	5:29).	Given	these	discrepancies,	I	share	Ameriks’s	































to	keep	 in	mind	what	Kant	means	by	a	 “deduction”.	As	he	explains	 in	 the	
subsequent	paragraph,	concepts	of	pure	understanding	or	categories	admit	
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justification.	 Just	 as	 examples	 from	mathematics	 and	 science	 con-
firm	the	reality	of	synthetic	a	priori	cognition,	judgments	from	ordi-
nary	people	confirm	the	reality	of	moral	consciousness.	Both provide 
us with grounds to infer the existence of a pure faculty within us, whether 
of cognition or of desire.
4. Kant’s Thought Experiments
4.1. An Advantage Like a Chemist































But	 that	pure	 reason,	without	 the	admixture	of	any	em-
pirical	determining	ground,	is	practical	of	itself	alone:	this	
one	had	to	be	able	to	show	from	the	most common practical 










26.	Citing	 this	passage,	Rawls	also	highlights	 the	 importance	of	 common	mor-
al	 judgment	 for	 interpreting	Kant’s	doctrine	of	 the	Fact	of	Reason.	On	 this	
point	I	am	indebted	to	his	approach.	However,	I	am	not	committed	to	Rawls’s	
further	claim	that	by	the	time	of	the	second	Critique	Kant	had	developed	“a	
constructivist	conception	of	practical	reason”	(Lectures on the History of Moral 
Philosophy,	268).	As	Kain	points	out	(“Realism	and	Anti-Realism”,	“Practical	







	 oȸen	ȸȢre Rethinking Kant’s Fact of Reason
philosophers’	imprint	 –		11		– vol.	14,	no.	32	(november	2014)
in	 the	 place	 of	 an	 honest	man)	 is	 confronted	with	 the	
moral	 law	 in	which	he	 cognizes	 the	worthlessness	of	 a	
liar,	his	practical	reason	(in	its	judgment	of	what	he	ought	
to	do)	at	once	abandons	the	advantage,	unites	with	what	
















29.	See	 also	 Rohden,	 “An	 Experiment	 with	 Practical	 Reason”,	 esp.	 103;	 Keller,	
“Two	Conceptions	of	Compatibilism”,	esp.	124,	and	Timmermann,	“Reversal	
or	Retreat?”,	esp.	88,	note	29.


































est	 (or	who	 just	 this	once	puts	himself	only	 in	 thought	
28.	Returning	now	to	the	obscure	passage	from	KpV,	AA	5:31,	we	can	see	that,	
far	from	resorting	to	a	dogmatic	position,	Kant	is	merely	stating	that	our	con-
sciousness	of	 the	moral	 law	 is	not	 accessible	outside	 a	normatively	 “thick”	
practical	perspective.	For	obvious	reasons,	it	is	not	accessible	from	a	specu-
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In	 working	 through	 the	 second	 scene,	 we	 stand	 to	 witness	 the	
man’s	inner	transformation,	whereby	he	comes	to	deliberate	without	
giving	priority	 to	 his	 own	happiness,	 and	 so	without	 letting	 empiri-





























Suppose	 someone	 asserts	 of	 his	 lustful	 inclination	 that,	
when	the	desired	object	and	the	opportunity	are	present,	
it	 is	 quite	 irresistible	 to	 him;	 ask	 him	whether,	 if	 a	 gal-


































































4.2. Spectator and Experiment
Before	moving	 forward,	 there	 is	 an	apparent	 inconsistency	 I	 should	
address.	Why	does	Kant	treat	the	reader	as	a	spectator in	the	experi-
ment	from	KpV,	AA	5:30?	Does	this	mean	he	is	not	trying	to	elicit	our	















This	 participatory	 element	 is	 central	 to	 Part	 II	 of	 the	 second	Cri-
tique,	 titled	 ‘Doctrine	of	 the	Method	of	Pure	Practical	Reason’.	Here	
Kant	argues	that	the	moral	law	must	have	a	more	powerful	effect	on	






















But	what	 is	quite	 remarkable,	 there	 is	even	one	 idea	of	
reason	 (which	 is	 in	 itself	 incapable	of	 any	presentation	










































with	Kant’s	usage	of	 ‘matters	of	 fact’	 from	the	Critique of the Power of 
Judgment	(1790);	and	(b)	that	it	lies	in	tension	with	a	claim,	defended	
34.	 See	also	KpV,	AA	5:158–159	for	the	example	of	Phalaris’s	bull.
35.	 See	 also	MS,	 AA	 6:483.	Most	 commentators	 overlook	 the	 connections	 be-
tween	Kant’s	doctrine	of	the	Fact	of	Reason	and	his	theory	of	moral	education	
from	Part	 II	of	 the	second	Critique.	For	exceptions	to	this	 trend,	see	Budick	
(Kant and Milton,	esp.	Ch.	5),	Guyer	(“Examples	of	Moral	Possibility”,	esp.	134,	
137),	and	Grenberg	(Common Moral Experience,	esp.	Ch.	9).






















evidence	 has	 defeasible, non-demonstrative	 force”	 (“Kant’s	 Legal	Meta-
phor”,	227;	my	emphasis).38
Now	 it	 is	 no	doubt	 true	 that	Kant	was	deeply	 influenced	by	 the	
juridical	procedures	of	his	day,	and	I	 think	 it	 is	useful	 to	emphasize	
37.	 In	a	footnote	Kant	also	explains	that	he	is	going	beyond	the	usual	meaning	
of	a	Tatsache.	As	he	writes:	“Here	I	extend	the	concept	of	a	matter	of	fact,	as	




38.	Proops	continues:	 “[W]hat	 really	matters,	 for	present	purposes,	 is	 the	very	
fact	that	Kant	envisages	such	proofs	at	all.	That	he	does	so	supports	a	view	of	
the	Fact	of	Reason	as	the	factum	of	the	Deduction	of	Freedom;	for	as	we	have	










ine	one	concept	we	are	led	directly	to	the	other,	and	vice versa (KpV, 
AA	5:29).	According	to	the	latter,	it	is	only	through	our	consciousness	










thesis	 in	mind	when	 he	 says	 freedom	 “can	 be	 established	 through	
practical	 laws	of	pure	 reason”	 (KU,	AA	5:648).	We	can	 then	qualify	
Kant’s	statement	 from	the	third	Critique	 in	 the	 following	way:	Strict-




dom,	because	 it	 is	only	 through	 the	moral	 law’s	necessity	 (as	a	 law	
that	commands	“completely	a	priori”)	that	we	first	become	aware	of	
the	independence	of	our	power	of	choice.	Qualified	in	this	way,	it	is	
36.	 ‘Reciprocity	 thesis’	 is	Allison’s	phrase	 (Kant’s Theory of Freedom);	 ‘disclosure	
thesis’	is	my	own.






6. A Final Objection: Skepticism About Moral Consciousness
As	I	noted	at	the	beginning	of	this	paper,	many	commentators	in	Kant’s	
day	 and	 our	 own	 have	 found	 the	 second	Critique	 disappointing	 be-












First	 of	 all,	Kant	 is	 ready	 to	 admit	 that	 our	 consciousness	 of	 the	
moral	law	is	“strange”	(befremdlich),	for	there	is	nothing	like	it	in	our	
entire	 field	 of	 practical	 cognition.	When	we	 attend	 to	 the	 necessity	
of	the	moral	law,	we	are	led	to	see	that	it	wholly	excludes	empirical	
motives	 from	 entering	 into	 our	maxims.	No	 other	 principle	—	hypo-




only	philosophers	 can	make	 the	 question	 of	 pure	morality	 “doubtful”	
(zweifelhaft)	 (KpV,	AA	5:155).	 In	another	work	he	 tells	us	why:	Only	
those	“who	are	accustomed	merely	to	explanations	by	natural	scienc-
es	will	not	get	into	their	heads	the	categorical	imperative	from	which	





















philosophy,	 stating	 that	 “we	 can	 content	 ourselves	with	 having	 dis-
played	[dargelegt]	 the	pure	use	of	our	cognitive	faculty	as	a	 fact	[den 
reinen Gebrauch unseres Erkenntnivermgens als Tatsache]”	(B5).	As	I	have	
shown,	there	is	a	continuity	in	the	argument-structure	of	these	texts.	
By	 attending	 to	 the	 epistemic	necessity	 in	 the	 concept	of	 space,	 for	
example,	we	can	see	that	it	must	spring	from	a	pure	(rather	than	an	
empirically	 conditioned)	 faculty	 of	 intuition.	 Likewise,	 by	 attending	
to	the	deliberative	necessity	in	the	moral	law,	we	can	see	that	it	must	
spring	 from	 a	 pure	 (rather	 than	 an	 empirically	 conditioned)	 faculty	




a	Regressive	Argument”.	 Limits	 of	 space	prevent	me	 from	exploring	 these	
similarities	further.










In	the	case	of	the	Critique of Pure Reason,	I	follow	the	standard	practice	
of	referring	to	the	1781	(A)	and	1787	(B)	editions.	For	all	other	texts,	ci-
tations	appear	in	the	order	of	abbreviation,	volume	number,	and	page	
number	 from	 the	Akademie Ausgabe	 (AA),	Kants Gesammelte Schriften, 
edited	 by	 Königlich Preussische akademie der Wissenschaften	 (29	 vols.	
Berlin:	de	Gruyter,	1902—).	All	translations	come	from	The Cambridge 
Edition of the Works of Immanuel Kant,	edited	by	Paul	Guyer	and	Allen	
W.	Wood	(Cambridge:	Cambridge	University	Press,	1992—).	Where	I	
depart	from	them,	I	add	‘modified’	after	the	in-text	citation.
GMS  Grundlegung zur Metaphysik der Sitten	(AA	4),	Groundwork 
for the Metaphysics of Morals,	trans.	Mary	Gregor.
KpV  Kritik der praktischen Vernunft	 (AA	 5),	Critique of Practical 
Reason,	trans.	Mary	Gregor.
KU   Kritik der Urteilskraft	(AA	5),	Critique of the Power of Judgment, 
trans.	Paul	Guyer	and	Eric	Matthews.










compelled	 irresistibly	by	 it”	 (MS,	AA	6:378).	 In	 this	way	 skepticism	
about	moral	consciousness	can	only	arise	for	those	who	seek	to	defend	
the	“omnipotence	of	theoretical	reason”	(MS,	AA	6:378).	Although	our	





















the	 Fact	 of	Reason	with	 further	proof	 is	 unfounded.	 It	 rests	 on	 the	
mistaken	 conviction	 that	 all	 facts,	 including	 facts	 of	 consciousness,	
must	conform	to	 theoretical	standards	of	explanation	(“all	of	which	
have	the	mechanism	of	natural	necessity	as	their	basis”).	From	what	





to	 that	 of chemistry”	 (KpV,	 AA	 5:163).	 The	way	 people	 immediately	
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